

5 | Lyndon Johnson and Environmental Policy

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IN QUANTITATIVE MEASURES ALONE the Johnson administration's "New Conservation" deserves more attention than it has yet received. No less than nine task forces directly addressed environmental problems (see list 1, Appendix). Between 1963 and 1968 the president signed into law almost three hundred conservation and beautification measures, which were supported by more than \$12 billion in authorized funds. This represented more environmental measures than had been passed during the preceding 107 years. The legislation spanned issues from land policy to water pollution and from wilderness areas to urban open space (see list 2, Appendix). Thirty-five areas were authorized for addition to the National Park Service.¹

Given the scale of legislative action and heightened national interest in the environment during the 1960s, it is surprising that the record of the Johnson administration remains diffuse—if not obscure. Admittedly, the field of Environmental History is quite new and its limits are still being defined. Yet, few historians have looked beyond the popular environmental signposts of the 1960s—such as Rachel L. Carson's *Silent Spring* (1962), the Santa Barbara oil spill (1969), the National Environmental Policy Act (1969)—to identify and evaluate the "New Conservation." Several questions, barely explored, require careful attention: How does the conservation and beautification record of the Johnson administration fit into the evolution of the modern environmental movement? Was the New Conservation really new? What was the role of President Johnson in establishing environmental policy between 1963 and 1968? An assessment of documents in the LBJ Library—and some speculations based on the existing literature—can begin to answer these questions.

From Conservationism to the Modern Environmental Movement

The variety and extent of the conservation and beautification programs of the Johnson presidency demonstrate a commitment to the environment that is on a par with any administration before or since. While not providing the leadership on every issue, the Johnson ad-

ministration's wide-ranging activity supports the claim that the 1960s constituted a transitional period from an old-style conservationism, concerned primarily with the utilization of natural resources, to a modern environmentalism, emphasizing quality-of-life issues and environmental protection.

The "old" conservation, initiated in the Progressive Era, was an effort to conserve, preserve, manage, or protect the nation's resources. As business reform was meant to bring order to the American economy of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, so conservation was meant to rationalize the use of natural resources. What came to be known as "the conservation movement" in the United States had its intellectual antecedents in eighteenth-century Europe and its American origins in the early nineteenth century.

By the late nineteenth century, several milestones had marked the coming of the movement, including the publication of George Perkins Marsh's *Man and Nature* (1864), the development of the "national park" idea, the establishment of the U.S. Geological Survey (1879), and the founding of John Muir's Sierra Club (1892). By the turn of the century the conservation movement had achieved national status, especially with the presidency of Theodore Roosevelt.

Public policy on resource questions after 1900 was guided by those who wished to prevent waste through efficient use—or resource conservationists—as opposed to those who were more interested in saving what remained of the wilderness—or preservationists. Some historians, such as J. Leonard Bates, thought that the conservationists of the Progressive Era were combatting the greed and wastefulness of the business world. Others, especially Samuel P. Hays, perceived that professionals and scientists from the East, acting from within the federal bureaucracy, were employing centralized policy-making powers to curtail the waste of resources and to establish programs of "wise use" in the West. This meant that western interests were often at loggerheads with federal conservationists, since the former wanted local control and the ability to exploit the resources for their own economic ends.²

The New Deal built on the legacy of the Progressive Era. Franklin Roosevelt brought into office a strong personal interest in conservation, and he surrounded himself with men of similar thought, such as Harold L. Ickes, Henry A. Wallace, Henry Morgenthau, Jr., and Hugh Hammond Bennett.³ But of more importance, the massive problems of the Great Depression—especially related to the dust bowl in the West and to economic strife in the South—helped to steer the New Deal government toward federal solutions to pressing environmental problems. The

soil-conservation program emphasized the efficient use and management of soil resources to preserve agricultural lands. A concern for grazing lands in the West led to the Taylor Grazing Act (1934). Reforestation programs, aided by the establishment of the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), complemented soil conservation. In addition, the New Deal government conducted several resource-development projects, led the drive to develop the nation's wildlands and rivers, and participated in a program of scientific game management.

The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) is probably the best known of the resource-development activities. It was the most sophisticated application of the multiple-use concept that had yet been devised. TVA was a multipurpose river project that involved flood control, the production of fertilizer, soil conservation, reforestation, the construction of inland waterways, the promotion of regional economic growth, and the generation of hydroelectric power. As part of the New Deal recovery program, TVA was also meant to serve as a source or unemployment relief in the South.

While the various conservation programs of the New Deal were not organized through a coherent environmental policy, there was little doubt that they perpetuated federal leadership in the management of the nation's resources. However, for several years after the New Deal, conservation policy on the national level failed to grow much beyond the narrow interest in resource management. The publication of Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring* in 1962 is often cited as the beginning of the modern environmental movement. Although Carson's attack on pesticides was significant, a single event did not give rise to such a diverse movement. The modern environmental movement in the United States arose during the 1960s, but its roots were embedded in the past, especially in resource conservation, preservationism, naturalism, antipollution, and public-health campaigns both in the United States and in Europe.

The recent origins of the movement are to be found in post-World War II natural-environment issues, such as outdoor recreation, wildlands, and open space; in concerns over environmental pollution; and in the maturing of ecological sciences. It is also linked to the "sixties" generation. Cynics have argued that political and economic elites either sponsored or supported environmental activities as a way of distracting protesters from antiwar, antipoverty, or civil-rights activities. However, the political and social turmoil of the 1960s presented an opportunity for raising questions about environmental protection, and it provided willing supporters, especially among idealistic teens and young adults.

The environmental movement was rooted in more than youthful idealism. While drawing its major support from the middle and upper-middle classes, politically it functioned as a coalition that cut across class lines and varying interests.⁴ Older preservation groups, such as the Sierra Club (1892) and the National Audubon Society (1905), were experiencing a revival of interest by the late 1960s and early 1970s. More recent organizations that had corporate backing, such as Resources for the Future (early 1950s) and Laurance Rockefeller's Conservation Foundation (mid 1960s), promoted the efficient utilization of resources. Legal remedies received attention from the Environmental Defense Fund (1967) and the Natural Resources Defense Council (1970).

Into the 1970s, aggressive and often militant protest and citizen action were carried out by groups such as Friends of the Earth (splintered off from the Sierra Club), Zero Population Growth, the National Wildlife Federation, and Ecology Action. Also individuals, such as biologists Rachel Carson and Barry Commoner, popularized and promoted the study of ecology. Beyond the borders of North America, "Green parties" and "ecoactivists" inaugurated their own versions of environmental protest.

Modern environmentalists generally shared an appreciation of the fragility of ecological balances, a notion of the intrinsic value of nature, a personal concern for health and fitness, and a commitment to self-reliance. They by no means espoused uniform political views or reform tactics. Some accepted governmental intervention as a way either to allocate resources or to preserve wildlands and natural habitats. Others were suspicious of any large institution as the protector of the environment. Some believed that the existing political and social structure was capable of balancing environmental protection and economic productivity. Still others blamed capitalism for promoting uncontrolled economic growth, materialism, the squandering of resources, and even the coopting of the environmental movement for capitalism's own ends.⁵

While the modern environmental movement gained national attention quite dramatically during the late 1960s and the early 1970s, we have only impressionistic notions of its roots, nature, scope, and achievements. Samuel P. Hays is attempting to provide a synthesis for the modern environmental movement in much the same way that he attempted to define and explain the conservation movement of the Progressive Era. Hays's long-awaited book on modern environmental politics is nearing completion, but glimpses of his synthesis have already appeared in several article-length studies. Hays supports the

notion that the early to mid 1960s were significant in the development of the modern environmental movement. He sees three distinct stages in the evolution of environmental action: the initial thrust, between 1957 and 1965, which emphasized natural environmental values in outdoor recreation, wildlands, and open space; the growing interest in "ecology," between 1965 and 1972, which focused on antipollution and environmental protection; and the period after 1972, which brought to public attention such issues as toxic chemicals, energy, and the possibilities of social, economic, and political decentralization.

While one might quibble with the precise chronological breakdown of the modern environmental era, Hays points to the significant shift from conservation to environmentalism during the 1960s, a shift that reinforces a growing belief among scholars that the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA) was as much a culmination as a new starting point for governmental interest in environmentalism. In this context the Johnson administration must be viewed as a transitional force in the evolution from old-style conservationism to modern environmentalism.⁶

The Johnson Administration in the Environmental Era

In a 1968 memorandum that summed up the conservation achievements of the Johnson administration, Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall stated:

A general conclusion—quite inescapable—is that Presidential leadership has changed the outlook of the nation with regard to conservation and has added vital "new dimensions." No longer is peripheral action—the "saving" of a forest, a park, a refuge for wildlife—isolated from the mainstream. The total environment is now the concern, and the new conservation makes man, himself, its subject. The quality of life is now the perspective and purpose of the new conservation.⁷

From his vantage point at the end of the Johnson presidency, Udall casts the administration in a visionary role—an advance agent of modern environmentalism. However, the very name New Conservation suggests a looking backward as well as a looking ahead. While environmental activity was vigorous, some programs were merely extensions of Progressive Era or New Deal resource management; others focused more clearly on antipollution and other quality-of-life issues.

In some cases the administration was a leader; in some, a follower; in others, a usurper. Despite Udall's claim, the New Conservation was not a coherent, consistent program.

This is not to say that the New Conservation was mere illusion or simply public relations. As a transitional concept it blended the governmental traditions of the past while reacting to contemporary environmental issues that were emanating from several sources—both inside and outside the government. An examination of the holdings of the Johnson Library suggests that the promotion of the New Conservation by Secretary Udall and others guided the president and several of his advisers toward a more sophisticated, holistic perspective on the environment. However, because the presidential papers essentially provide a "view from the top," they also reveal the perspective of national leaders who were taking credit for pioneering programs and policies that were as much the result of mounting grass roots sentiment and congressional actions as of executive leadership. However, before we can set limits on the Johnson administration's achievements in establishing environmental policies and programs, we must try to determine what forces shaped the New Conservation within the government. A brief look at key individuals and groups who were close to the president is in order.

The Legacy of JFK

As with other issues, it is difficult to determine exactly what impact a completed term by John F. Kennedy would have had on environmental policies and legislation. It seems clear, however, that the Kennedy presidency provided the most-immediate momentum for the New Conservation of the Johnson years. Kennedy was the first president since Franklin D. Roosevelt to take any direct initiative on environmental policy. During the 1960 presidential campaign, Kennedy authorized the Natural Resources Advisory Committee. One of his first special messages to Congress, in February, 1961, dealt with the development and conservation of natural resources. In May, 1962, he called the White House Conference on Conservation, which went beyond the old "wise-use" issues to examine questions dealing with the deteriorating quality of the environment.

While Kennedy's congressional record on the environment was anemic, he brought a new mind set to the presidency which led naturally into an elaboration of environmental policy on many fronts. Most significantly, he rejected the notion that environmental issues were state and local responsibilities. His predecessor, Dwight D. Eisenhower, had believed that the federal role in conservation and anti-

pollution could be extended, but only if additional federal funding was not involved. James L. Sundquist has noted: "The major contribution of John F. Kennedy to national thinking about the outdoor environment was, perhaps, an open mind about the budget."⁸ The exercise of federal authority, backed by a commitment to more federal funding, was the underpinning for Kennedy's environmental policy. It was the Johnson administration, however, that took action on those impulses.⁹

Lady Bird

The terms *natural beauty* and *beautification* permeated the conservation rhetoric of the Johnson administration. In a speech to the 1964 graduating class of the University of Michigan, President Johnson asserted: "We have always prided ourselves on being not only America the strong and America the free, but America the beautiful."¹⁰ Indeed, one of the working groups that developed the Great Society programs was on "natural beauty." And most significantly, in May, 1965, the White House Conference on Natural Beauty met in Washington, D.C., and produced its report, "Beauty for America."¹¹

Lady Bird Johnson was the person who was most responsible for the president's heightened aesthetic sense. In response to the 1965 State of the Union address, she stated: "I liked the accent on education, on medical research, and on preserving this nation's beauty—the preservation of the beauty of America along the highways, in the cities, in National Parks—'the green legacy for tomorrow.' I hope we can do something about that in our four years here."¹² Between 1965 and 1968 she actively sought to make "natural beauty" a key national issue.

Casual observers of the Johnson administration's environmental record have difficulty in seeing beyond what they believe to have been the superficial commitment to environmentalism that was expressed in the drive for natural beauty. To the severest critics, the beautification projects of the First Lady were little more than aesthetic frivolities. This kind of criticism underestimates the influence that Lady Bird had on her husband and the catalytic role that she played in raising environmental issues to national attention. The concern for beautification may not have taken environmental issues much beyond traditional conservation, but it did reinforce the commitment that grass-root organizations and the Kennedy administration brought to the issues.

A memo from Matthew Nimetz to Joseph Califano noted that an article in the December, 1967, issue of *Sports Illustrated* was "critical

of the Federal effort [on the environment] to date: it says we concentrate too much on 'natural beauty' and too little on more fundamental problems."¹³ Whether that is a fair assertion is another question, but it is a testament to the influence of the First Lady that the drive for beautification carried such significance. Lady Bird's campaign against billboards, her plea for urban beautification, and her support for preserving natural beauty kept environmental issues before the American people and on the agenda of the president. Secretary Udall wrote to the president that "the leadership of the First Lady and her nation-wide crusade for beautification has been a vital part of [the] attempt to re-educate the country."¹⁴ While the president was prone to refer to the beautification program as "Lady Bird's business," her activities brought to Washington a key ingredient necessary in order to launch an effective environmental program.¹⁵

Stewart L. Udall

Within the administration, no one wielded more influence over conservation policy than did Secretary of the Interior Udall, the first Arizonan to be selected for the cabinet. Udall had interrupted his college studies to work for two years as a Mormon missionary; then he had served in World War II; and ultimately he had practiced law in Tucson with his brother, Morris. Beginning in 1954, Stewart Udall had served his first of his three terms as a United States congressman. On the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs, he was recognized as a member of the "conservation bloc." In 1959 a House fight over a labor bill brought him into contact with Senator John F. Kennedy. Udall's delivery of Arizona's votes at the 1960 Democratic National Convention, according to Douglas H. Strong, "won Kennedy's gratitude and Lyndon B. Johnson's respect for his [Udall's] political skill." It also won Udall the secretaryship of the Department of the Interior, a position that he held from 1961 through 1969.¹⁶

Prone to impulsive statements and lacking strong administrative ability, Udall made a slow start as secretary of the interior. In time, this dedicated conservationist and dedicated liberal made his presence felt in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. For most of his tenure, he maintained a good working relationship with both presidents, keeping environmental issues constantly before them. He found LBJ to be "very receptive" to new programs and policies, but Udall also believed that the successes that were achieved during the Johnson years would probably have come also if Kennedy had served his full term.¹⁷

Udall played an important role as cheerleader in both administrations, persuading Kennedy to send a conservation message to Con-

gress, the first such in decades; encouraging Lady Bird to stress beautification and conservation programs; and reminding LBJ of the importance of the New Conservation. Beyond that role, Udall was a central advocate of expanded programs in numerous areas, including outdoor recreation, the national park system, and antipollution.¹⁸

Udall embodied the faith that the federal government could lead the country in the conservation battle. This was not to be symbolic leadership but was to be a commitment to fund new programs and to invest in environmental protection. In Udall's words and actions could be seen the transformation of old-style conservationism into modern environmentalism. He was among the first government officials to defend the conclusions of Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring*. His perspective on the role of the Interior Department also reflected a change in direction. Rather than administering the department as a loosely knit group of bureaus and agencies that promoted resource development and protected western interests, he saw the department's mission as serving national environmental needs. He was not without inconsistencies, however. When issues of water development and scenic conservation clashed, Udall tended to take the traditional pose of the westerner, so he supported water development.¹⁹

In *The Quiet Crisis* (1963), Udall stated his philosophy in clear terms:

America today stands poised on a pinnacle of wealth and power, yet we live in a land of vanishing beauty, of increasing ugliness, of shrinking open space, and of an overall environment that is diminished daily by pollution and noise and blight.

This, in brief, is the quiet conservation crisis of the 1960's.²⁰

Udall's rhetoric showed many of the signs of the modern environmental movement—namely, a relatively broad ecological perspective, a concern for quality-of-life issues, and a commitment to environmental protection. However, his preoccupation with traditional conservation issues—such as land policy, national parks, reclamation, and resource management—marked him as a transitional figure in the history of American environmentalism more than as a pioneer of a new ethic.²¹

President Lyndon B. Johnson

The Kennedy legacy, Lady Bird, and Stewart Udall—all helped to create the New Conservation as well as to shape Lyndon Johnson's own environmental views. But other factors—less direct but equally

obvious—also influenced the president. In a 1973 *Audubon Magazine* editorial, for example, one of Johnson's admirers wrote: "The man from the Texas hill country had a deep love for the land, and his efforts to preserve and restore it not only laid the foundation for the environmental crusade of the 1970s, but enriched the quality of life for all Americans."²² By implication, at least, Johnson emerges from these lines as the modern equivalent of Franklin Roosevelt—as he liked to be reminded by his aides and advisers. Udall stated in an oral interview that Johnson "thought about the land a lot the way Roosevelt did. Roosevelt was his idol and you could come up with a good idea and say, 'This is good for the land and good for the people,' he bought it."²³ The comparison with FDR the conservationist—which crops up repeatedly in the literature—gave Johnson yet-another important link to his revered political past as a Roosevelt liberal. If for no other reason, Johnson could give broad support to the New Conservation as perpetuating the goals of the New Deal.

Yet Johnson had a broader vision for America than the New Deal—namely, the Great Society. By happy coincidence, rising grassroots interest in quality-of-life issues tapped the spirit of the Great Society that President Johnson envisioned. In his speech at the University of Michigan he claimed that the Great Society was "a place where the city of man serves not only the needs of the body and the demands of commerce but the desire for beauty and the hunger for community. . . . It is a place where men are more concerned with the quality of their goals than the quantity of their goods."²⁴ In a letter of thanks to a member of the Task Force on Natural Resources (1964), Johnson noted the need for "imaginative programs of resource development," and he added: "In the years immediately ahead we have, I believe, an unparalleled opportunity to take some major steps forward toward creating the Great Society. You and your colleagues on the Natural Resources Task Force have made a major contribution toward that goal."²⁵

The impulse for a federal solution to social problems, which was deeply embedded in the Great Society, was firmly connected to the environmental programs of the Johnson years. The noted environmentalist Lynton K. Caldwell argued, in *Environment: A Challenge for Modern Society* (1970):

Lyndon B. Johnson . . . anticipated the environmental quality issue in his Great Society address, on May 22, 1964, which spoke directly to the values of the post-World War II generation that would shortly determine the direction of American politics.

His espousal of natural beauty and environmental quality surprised and gratified conservationists, who had not looked for this type of commitment from a professional politician from western Texas. The depth of the Johnson commitment was open to question. But regardless of the President's sincerity, the fact that he had publicly identified himself with the environmental issue strengthened its position in American political life.²⁶

Caldwell's cynicism about Johnson's sincerity in promoting the New Conservation is not completely unwarranted. The president's Great Society idealism was clearly tempered by his political pragmatism. Geographer Richard A. Cooley has argued that in supporting programs in conservation and natural beauty, Johnson "knew a political issue when he saw one."²⁷ And Caldwell, assessing the Democrats' stance on environmental issues during the 1964 presidential campaign, asserted that candidate Johnson stayed clear of potentially dangerous environmental-quality issues—pollution, urban sprawl, public transportation—by associating with "the more easily managed expression 'natural beauty.'"²⁸ On the other side, John P. Crevelli accepts LBJ's environmentalism as sincere: "There is no other conclusion to make than that Johnson believed in his words."²⁹ Also, as a strong advocate of "more is better," Johnson took great pride in the "sheer bulk" of legislation during his administration.³⁰

Johnson certainly took advantage of the growing environmental spirit of the times. And there is little doubt that as a professional politician, he sensed the value of the New Conservation to his larger Great Society goals. However, the influence of FDR and the New Deal, the Kennedy legacy, Lady Bird, and Stewart Udall cannot be ignored if we are to have a complete picture of Johnson's commitment to environmentalism. A reasonable conclusion is that Lyndon Johnson—through a variety of influences—supported the New Conservation as an integral part of his Great Society. In this way, he helped to place environmental issues in a larger political context. To be sure, there were limits to his environmentalism; these are manifest in political constraints and partisan considerations, in distractions from myriad social programs, and in his preoccupation with the Vietnam War.

In order to better understand the breadth and depth of the New Conservation, we must look beyond presidential leadership to the bureaucratic structure that devised the executive environmental policy and to the legislative activity that produced new environmental laws.

Key Departments and Agencies

The New Conservation was not simply the province of a small group of individuals—not even the president. To what extent the Johnson administration was committed to a new direction in environmental policies and programs depended, in part at least, on the interaction of key departments and agencies. Even after the establishment of the Environmental Protection Agency during the Nixon administration, environmental programs were diffused throughout the federal bureaucracy, with no central clearing house for the establishment of policy. This suggests that U.S. environmental policy has been and still remains fragmented, reflecting the collective interests and actions of governmental agencies and of Congress.

At least since the New Deal, there have been several attempts to consolidate federal environmental programs into a single department in order to offset the fragmentation of environmental policy. A favorable political climate during the 1960s led congressional leaders and officials in the Johnson administration to seek such a consolidation. In 1964 the President's Task Force on Government Organization, which was chaired by Donald K. Price, recommended that five new executive departments be created, including a Department of Natural Resources (DNR). One option suggested the merging of the Departments of Interior and of Agriculture, with nonresource programs going to other departments. The other option was that the Department of Agriculture be retained but that the Forest Service and the Soil Conservation Service be transferred to the Department of the Interior. With either option, the task force recommended that some water-resource functions of the Federal Power Commission and of the Army Corps of Engineers be moved to the new Department of Natural Resources. Little came of these plans.

In 1965, Senator Frank E. Moss of Utah again proposed that natural-resource agencies be reorganized into a DNR. The Corps of Engineers, perpetually an opponent of reorganization, fought the Moss bill. The corps favored the status quo as a way of protecting its monopoly over dozens of public-works projects. In addition, the Bureau of the Budget argued against giving to the new department the coordination and planning functions that Congress had assigned to the Water Resources Council through the Water Resources Planning Act of 1965.

In 1967 the President's Task Force on Government Organization, chaired by Ben Heineman, called for an even larger Department of Natural Resources and Development, which would include the Corps of (Civil) Engineers and the Departments of the Interior, Housing and

Urban Development, Transportation, and Agriculture. By this time, the fate of such attempts at reorganization was preordained.³¹

The very reason for the attempted mergers is why they never occurred—namely, the vested interests of the departments and agencies. The development of programs has most often taken priority over making comprehensive environmental policy, since programs can be controlled by the agencies, whereas policy cannot be. Secretary Udall favored a Department of Natural Resources for the obvious reason that the Department of the Interior stood to gain the most from such an arrangement. But he, too, recognized the difficulties posed by interagency rivalry. In a memorandum to Joseph Califano, Udall stated his belief that the Johnson administration could “succeed where the others failed” if the president would formulate a “sound plan,” if congressional realities were kept in mind, and if the Cabinet would observe “team discipline.”³² But Udall had to depend upon the president to initiate the action that would create the DNR. And Johnson was too much the politician to be caught up in such a web.

Even relatively small-scale change in the environmental apparatus created serious internal tensions. In 1966, Udall attempted to secure the transfer of water-pollution programs from HEW to Interior. Originally, Udall sought the transfer of air-pollution programs as well, but he trimmed down his request. Key adviser Joseph Califano initially cautioned the president not to rush into a decision to authorize the transfer: “The political feasibility of such action at a time when HEW is considering an Assistant Secretary for Environment is highly questionable.” However, he eventually supported Udall's stance, arguing that most of the outside experts on the task force agreed with the move since the president had initiated his program “to attack water pollution on a river basin basis.”³³

HEW Secretary John W. Gardner was predictably strenuous in his opposition, arguing that since Interior had close working relations with the oil and mining industries—which were major industrial polluters—that the department had “a built-in conflict of interest.”³⁴ Senator Edmund S. Muskie of Maine, one of the leading congressional environmentalists, pointed to the impropriety of dismantling and transferring the new Water Pollution Control Administration—established under HEW's control in 1965—before it had been fully established and was operational. He also pointed out that Interior was western oriented, while the most serious pollution problems were in the East. And he warned about the potential political fallout from such an untimely move, namely, fuel for the Republicans' claim of “Administration confusion,” and criticism from state and local officials.³⁴

Udall, however, prevailed in this miniwar. Clearly, Interior feared the repercussions from having both Interior and HEW set standards for water quality, rather than having HEW maintain control of the Water Pollution Control Administration. Dual responsibility would mean having Interior set the standards on river-basin plans and having HEW set the standards on all other rivers. Also, enforcement might become inconsistent. Most significantly, dual responsibility would pit HEW and Interior against each other in relations with Congress and the president. Udall's advisers asked: "If we were starting from scratch today would we create a Corps of Engineers and a Bureau of Reclamation?"³⁵

The dispute over the Water Pollution Control Administration points to the need for a better understanding of the internal workings of executive agencies—such as Interior, Agriculture, HEW, the Federal Power Commission (FPC), and TVA—that are responsible for environmental programs.³⁶ Interdepartmental or interagency rivalries also help to demonstrate why national environmental policy remained fragmented and particularist in the wake of a more holistic perspective on the environment that was coming from outside the government during the 1960s.

It is unfair, however, to assume that the relative influence of governmental agencies that are concerned with the environment remained static. Stewart Udall's expertise and his close working relationship with the president gave Interior much leverage over its cabinet rivals. The Public Health Service, which traditionally had played an important role in antipollution, was being raided by other agencies. A case in point is the transfer of its water-pollution programs to HEW and then to Interior. The most significant shift in influence over environmental policy during the Johnson years was the rise of the Office of Science and Technology (OST), which played an increasingly important role in advising the president on issues of environmental quality. In many ways, OST functioned like the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), which was established along with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) in 1970. The CEQ proved to be a relatively weak advisory body, but it was the only government agency designed to oversee energy and environmental issues.

OST provided an overview of energy and environmental issues, but it was more aggressive in asserting itself than was the CEQ. In 1957, President Dwight Eisenhower had created the post of special assistant to the president for science and technology as a response to the launching of Sputnik. In 1962, President Kennedy had established the Office of Science and Technology, with the special assis-

tant retaining primacy in matters concerning national-security policy, intelligence, arms control, and other international initiatives. In addition, the Office of Director of Defense Research and Engineering was created, to reduce the work load in the area of military problems.³⁷

Under the leadership of Director Donald F. Hornig, OST began to broaden its responsibilities to include problems of health and the environment. Precedent for such a move went back as far as 1959, when the President's Science Advisory Committee intervened to study a public scare over tainted cranberries on the eve of the holiday season.³⁸ Little by little, Hornig brought OST into most major environmental issues that the Johnson administration was facing. OST participated in several environmental task forces; director Hornig chaired both the 1966 Task Force on Natural Resource Studies and the 1968 Task Force on the Quality of the Environment.

Hornig noted in an oral interview that OST's range of activities was dictated by "the sense of significance, either by what matters to the President at any given time or perhaps more important—is to try to anticipate for him what is going to matter."³⁹ Without the heavy programmatic commitment of other agencies that had interests in the environment—and the limits that go with it—OST could range over many issues without significant constraint. Of particular importance was the role of OST in promoting the coordination of and the providing of data on the scientific and technical programs relating to pollution abatement.⁴⁰

Despite its flexibility in addressing environmental issues, OST was wary about attempts to weaken its power. Senator Gaylord Nelson of Wisconsin introduced a bill in July, 1965, to designate Interior as the primary agency for ecological research. But OST opposed the bill and, through a delay in its own study of research programs, helped to table it. When he reintroduced his bill, Senator Nelson proposed to locate a council on environmental quality in the office of the president. Again, OST successfully headed off such a plan.⁴¹

While OST kept potential rivals at bay in the Johnson administration, the establishment of the EPA and the CEQ during the Nixon years had diminished its influence over environmental matters. Without enforcement functions and without its own programs to manage, OST never was likely to emerge as an omnibus agency like a department of natural resources. OST's *de facto* role in coordinating environmental policy was formalized with the CEQ, thus offering an important precedent but with the same limits. EPA assumed primary responsibility for enforcing antipollution laws, but it rarely demonstrated a capacity for providing a policy overview. Vested in-

terests that were based upon a broad distribution of programs throughout the federal bureaucracy worked against a coordinated environmental policy—or at least against interagency cooperation. Yet during the Johnson years, OST—and Interior—broadened the efforts of the executive branch in addressing environmental quality as a national issue.

Major Environmental Issues, 1963–68

The Johnson administration's support for and development of environmental legislation was vigorous, but it was not clearly focused nor well coordinated. The vigor grew out of a response to (1) the leadership of Stewart Udall, Lady Bird, and others within the administration; (2) grass-roots enthusiasm for many quality-of-life issues; and (3) the actions of congressional leaders, such as Senators Muskie, Nelson, and Henry M. Jackson (Washington), Congressman Wayne Aspinall (Indiana), and others. The lack of focus and coordination stemmed from the complexity and scope of the issues, the relative newness of "environmentalism" as opposed to "conservationism," and the nature of the federal bureaucracy.

The overarching goal of the administration—if there was one—was to wed concern over the environment to the larger goals of the Great Society. This meant either identifying with continuing congressional efforts at environmental reform or writing new legislation. New proposals came primarily from special task forces—nine in all—which focused on recreation, natural resources, natural beauty, environmental pollution, and energy.⁴² In large measure, the early task forces focused on traditional issues of conservation—the wilderness, water resources, wildlife—but increasingly the studies emphasized pollution problems and the urban environment. By and large, the administration's proposals on conservation enhanced the existing programs rather than redirecting them. However, the antipollution measures were more far-reaching, while the conceptual emphasis on the urban environment was very innovative.

Wilderness, Parks, and Public Lands

The rhetoric of "natural beauty" tended to camouflage the administration's emphasis on traditional conservation programs during the early Johnson years. Especially through Udall's leadership, the administration concentrated on extending the national park system and the public-lands program rather than on reevaluating the basic tenets of conservation. In response to the 1964 Task Force on the Preserva-

tion of Natural Beauty, Interior noted that the report failed to discuss the Wilderness Act and various proposals in regard to national parks.⁴³ But the 1966 Task Force on Natural Resource Studies devoted considerable attention to the administration's plan to expand the national park system, to develop a national trails system, and to extend the national forest system. A Bureau of the Budget memorandum explained why there was such a shift of emphasis: "The Task Force has not really functioned as a Task Force. Secretary Udall requested suggestions from each of the agencies involved. . . . The report, therefore, reflects Secretary Udall's views, with very little consideration of priorities as reflected in the responsibilities of other agencies of the Government."⁴⁴

Udall was at his persuasive best in promoting traditional conservation programs, despite the grumblings of some officials who wanted the environmental agenda to expand more rapidly. Given the momentous impact of the Wilderness Act in 1964, however, the administration could hardly begin to set environmental policy without taking into account the important upsurge of interest in land and water conservation.

The passage of the Wilderness Act in 1964 was a conservation landmark. The act set aside four wilderness areas totaling 9.1 million acres in the national forests. It also included a provision whereby large roadless tracts in national parks, monuments, and wildlife refuges could be added to the designated wilderness areas. According to historian Roderick Nash, the concept of a wilderness system "marked an innovation in the history of the American preservation movement. It expressed . . . a determination to take the offensive. Previous friends of the wilderness had been largely concerned with *defending* it against various forms of development."⁴⁵

The legislative battle over the wilderness had raged for nine years. The drive for wilderness legislation had begun in 1955, when Howard Zahniser, executive director of the Wilderness Society, had proposed it in a speech before a conference in Washington of the American Planning and Civic Association. The actions of the Wilderness Society, the Sierra Club and other groups, brought the idea of wilderness preservation to congressional attention. And while the 1964 act fell short of the preservationists' goals, a permanent wilderness system was created at last.⁴⁶ Although the Johnson administration did not initiate the Wilderness Act, it did incorporate the legislation into its general conservation program. Public-land-management agencies, including the Forest Service, preferred managerial discretion rather than legislative decree to set land policy. Secretary Udall and other ad-

ministration leaders, however, did not resist the new momentum; they promoted additional mandates for wildlands and scenic and recreational programs.

The Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission (ORRRC)—a study commission established by Congress—made several recommendations which led to new actions. For example, the Land and Water Conservation Fund Act of 1964 was passed in direct response to the ORRRC's recommendations. This act provided funds for the acquisition of lands within the national forests, which was the first major opportunity to add land to the system during the post-World War II era. In 1968 the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act and the National Trail System Act followed. The North Cascades (in Washington), the Canyonlands (in Utah), and the Redwoods (in California) were added to the national park system, and Guadalupe Mountains (in Texas) was authorized. In addition, new categories of federal land administration were created—national seashores, lakeshores, and recreational areas.⁴⁷

The accomplishments of the early to mid 1960s were not achieved in a vacuum; environmental groups and the federal courts also played a vital role.⁴⁸ But the vigor with which the administration pursued the elaboration of the wilderness and national parks systems, especially through Udall's relentless leadership, graphically demonstrates the extension of federal power in land- and water-use programs. These programs also fit the spirit of the Great Society and firmly grounded the "New Conservation" in traditional conservation causes.

Of course, considerations of practical politics determined the extent to which the president supported his Interior secretary's conservation goals. John P. Crevelli has raised some important questions about the politics of wilderness preservation during the Johnson years in his article in *Prologue*, "The Final Act of the Greatest Conservation President." In this case study about an eleventh-hour attempt in 1968 to greatly increase the nation's parklands, Crevelli discusses why Johnson settled for an additional three hundred thousand acres rather than an anticipated seven million acres. Political reality persuaded the president to accept a small victory rather than a great defeat. In the final days of his presidency, with the Vietnam War and countless domestic programs consuming his time and with his power slipping away, Johnson was fearful of asking for too much and, in the end, getting nothing. "His ego," Crevelli concluded, "would not permit a final defeat at the hands of the Congress over which he had been master for so many years on most domestic affairs."⁴⁹

A personal consequence of Johnson's decision was an abrupt end to the strong professional and personal relationship between LBJ and Udall. In settling for three hundred thousand acres, the Sonora Desert reserve had been omitted. This large parcel was located in Udall's own congressional district in Arizona. The Interior secretary believed that Johnson had omitted the parcel to show him "who was boss," not an uncommon LBJ trait. It is more likely, however, that this decision was based on the president's belief in the "art of the possible."⁵⁰

Water Resources

Water resources were an important component in the New Conservation. Again, the scale of activity was more impressive than the innovation in approach. A possible exception was the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, a companion measure to the Wilderness Act, which created a system of wild rivers. Within the administration, it was perceived to be as historic as the wilderness bill. In 1965, President Johnson had suggested, in his message to Congress on natural beauty, that it was time to identify and preserve "free flowing stretches of our great scenic rivers before growth and development make the beauty of the unspoiled waterway only a memory."⁵¹ A bill was prepared, which passed the Senate but died in a House committee. Again in 1967, Johnson had repeated his plea for scenic rivers, and the Ninetieth Congress obliged by passing a compromise bill. In all, in the Eighty-ninth and Ninetieth Congresses, seventeen bills had been introduced dealing with scenic and recreational rivers.⁵²

The National Wild and Scenic Rivers Act established a river system that was composed of segments of eight rivers, made provision for additions to the system, and encouraged state participation in the preservation of scenic rivers. While the establishment of public recreational areas was not new and while the practice of federal condemnation authority to acquire areas for public purposes was not new either, the law raised controversies over the "public good" versus private property rights and over development versus nondevelopment. These issues were made intense because some of the rivers ran outside of federal lands through populated areas in the East, rather than through public lands in the West. Coming at the end of the Johnson presidency, the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act showed many of the signs of a more aggressive environmentalism that would surface during the 1970s.⁵³

President Johnson's interest in the new law, as well as in other water projects, was strong and sincere. Udall has recalled:

He always had a lot of insight on water problems and this grew out of the New Deal period and the dams that were being built in his own congressional district. He had an intimacy with water projects. He knew how they functioned and this, of course, was something that President Kennedy did not have and it was something that worked to my advantage.⁵⁴

While the Johnson administration may not have seriously challenged the status quo with its various water projects, it did promote a wide array of programs. The president gave support to the International Hydrological Decade, a world-wide effort to advance knowledge about water issues. Desalination programs were discussed extensively. Governmental officials gave the proper attention to water-development projects, which were important political links between Washington and the state governments.⁵⁵ They also generally supported the authority of the Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation in building dams and reservoirs, constructing canals, and promoting flood control. However, growing criticism of the agencies for their narrow cost-benefit approach to the development of water projects led, in part at least, to the Federal Water Project Recreation Act of 1965. The act gave local governments a greater role in planning and financing federal water projects and, most importantly, gave legislative recognition to the idea that recreation and wildlife were "benefits" that were equal to economic and other utilitarian wants and needs.⁵⁶

As with other components of the New Conservation, setting water-resources policy was understood to be primarily a federal responsibility. In 1965, President Johnson authorized officials in the Bureau of the Budget to recommend that Congress establish a national water commission to review long-term requirements for water and how the requirements should be achieved. A memorandum to Joe Califano from the Bureau of the Budget noted that "the long range water problems in the Southwest are no more acute—and probably less acute—than those in the Great Lakes and the New York-New England areas."⁵⁷

Some water issues were recognized but were not successfully acted upon during the Johnson years. For example, in the mid 1960s, coastal wetlands began to attract attention because of their recreational potential, but also because of their environmental significance in preserving wildlife and in acting as natural flood reservoirs and pollution-treatment systems. The 1966 Task Force on Resources and Recreation recommended that the Interior Department study estu-

arine areas and called for the department to "protect and preserve in their natural condition" estuarine areas that were considered to be valuable for sport and commercial fishing, wildlife conservation, outdoor recreation, scenic beauty, and scientific study. It also called for permits to be issued by Interior before anyone could dredge or fill in a navigable estuarine area, and it recommended that there be stricter control of the army's projects in regard to shore-erosion control, dredging, filling, or beach protection.

However, a bill that was introduced in the Ninetieth Congress to institute the permit system was badly diluted. As finally passed, the act only authorized \$250,000 for fiscal years 1969 and 1970 for the purpose of conducting a study and an inventory of estuaries. But funds were never appropriated. In addition, Congress reduced the authorization of other funds for a study of estuarine pollution to be made by the Federal Water Pollution Control Administration. As a result of federal inaction and growing public interest, some states—such as Massachusetts, Maryland, and Florida—took the lead during the late 1960s and the early 1970s in passing laws to protect coastal wetlands, while others—such as New York, Michigan, and Wisconsin—developed programs to protect inland wetlands.⁵⁸

Wildlife

Historian Thomas Dunlap has argued that the movement for the protection of endangered species has gone through two phases. The first began during the early 1960s with a broad interest in protecting wildlife. The second phase emerged with the passage of the Endangered Species Act in 1973 and with the more difficult task of administering a practical program. "Legal protection for endangered species," Dunlap has stated, "began casually." The Land and Water Conservation Act of 1964 established a fund to support federal and state outdoor recreational and wildlife work, which was broadly defined. The Endangered Species Act of 1966—the first act of its kind—was not designed to expand the scope of federal power. It did not define endangered species effectively, and it did not clarify the problem of cooperation with the states in developing a plan of action. The secretary of the Interior was authorized to buy land, but he could not regulate the taking of endangered species.⁵⁹

During the 1960s the federal government made some gestures to protect species from extinction, but a practical program still lay in the future. Secretary Udall was the major administration force behind wildlife protection. In fact, Udall's last act as secretary of the Interior was to sign a final order creating two wildlife refuges. However, he

was unable to get the kind of attention from the president on this matter that he had on water projects. The three-hundred-thousand-acre "parting gift to future generations," which Johnson agreed to during the final hours of his administration, would aid wildlife conservation, but it was not part of a broad plan of wildlife conservation.⁶⁰ Clearly, a changing public attitude toward nature during the postwar years and the efforts of environmental groups at the grass roots influenced the writing of future wildlife legislation to a greater extent than did the efforts of the Johnson administration.⁶¹

Pollution Control

In the area of pollution control, the New Conservation demonstrated a close association with the modern environmental movement. Several issues and events stimulated the interest in antipollution measures. Rachel Carson's assault on pesticides is a good example of the shift from traditional conservation to a focus on human well-being. The concern over the destruction of wildlife habitats helped to stimulate an interest in the functioning of ecological systems. Environmental groups drew attention to the exploitation of natural resources. The strip mining of coal attracted considerable debate. The commercial viability of nuclear power raised questions about radiation, the siting of plants, and reactor safety. The ubiquity of air pollution—especially in the form of smog and coal smoke—moved policy makers toward clean-air standards. And oil spills, jet-engine noise, and various industrial pollutants brought into high relief the contradictions of the drive for economic growth and the wish for an improved quality of life.⁶²

President Johnson set a dramatic tone about pollution in several of his public statements in the mid 1960s. For example:

Ours is a nation of affluence. But the technology that has permitted our affluence spews out vast quantities of wastes and spent products that pollute our air, poison our waters, and even impair our ability to feed ourselves. At the same time, we have crowded together into dense metropolitan areas where concentration of wastes intensifies the problem.

Pollution now is one of the most pervasive problems of our society.⁶³

In principle, at least, antipollution was an integral part of the Great Society.

The administration's general approach to antipollution was consistent with the other components of its environmental policy—to confront what were perceived as national issues through the broader exercise of federal authority. The 1964 Task Force on Environmental Pollution outlined an extensive program concerning "The Federal Responsibility for Pollution." A list of fourteen guidelines for policy was presented, including federal initiative on interstate compacts or other regional plans to combat pollution; international cooperation to abate pollution in river basins, air sheds, and water zones; the development and management of economic incentives to reduce pollution; the implementation of new technical expertise to solve problems; improved monitoring systems; and better public-information programs.⁶⁴

Whether the administration could translate its broad interest in antipollution into tangible policy was another question. While an appreciation for the functioning of ecological systems helped to identify a growing list of pollutants, legislators and administration officials responded to discrete problems instead of dealing with pollution in a holistic manner. This was the most obvious—but not necessarily the most effective—way to confront pollution problems, especially since no single agency in the federal government had the overall responsibility for pollution control at the time.

Air pollution emerged as a national problem because of the criticism of coal burning by utilities and other industrial users and also because of the rising concern over smog. Through the encouragement of health officials and academics, HEW had sponsored the first National Conference on Air Pollution in 1958. The tone of the conference was cooperation between industry and government to reduce air pollution, but it attracted few people from the coal industry and few conservationists. By the time of the third Conference on Air Pollution in 1966, both coal and environmental interests were well represented. During the mid 1960s a relatively innocuous law—the Clean Air Act of 1955—underwent several revisions that were potentially injurious to the coal and electric-utility industries. The 1967 act changed the emphasis from air pollution as a local problem to air pollution as a national problem, but one that required cooperation between industry and government. In the broadest sense, this revision brought industry into the policy-formation phase of air-pollution legislation, resulting in a Clean Air Act that many felt was "coal's law."⁶⁵

A relatively new source of air pollution—automobile emissions—posed different problems. Los Angeles, the "smog capital of America"

during the 1950s, became a living laboratory for studying massive doses of auto emissions. It became apparent during the 1960s that smog was a national problem, requiring the attention of the federal government. While California led the way in emissions control, federal law slowly moved toward a recognition of the problem. The 1963 Clean Air Act for the first time gave the federal government limited enforcement power over interstate pollution. The 1965 amendment to that act recognized the need to control motor-vehicle pollution on a national scale, and it empowered HEW to establish and enforce air-pollution standards for new motor vehicles. The 1967 Air Quality Act was the first piece of federal legislation that was designed to control lead emissions. But the automobile and oil industries continually resisted tougher standards; and while the public paid homage to clean air, it resented carrying the burden of responsibility through higher costs and reduced automobile performance.⁶⁶

There had been considerable support for some type of federal standards both in Congress and in the executive branch. But what kind of standards? Senator Muskie—"Mr. Pollution Control"—generally opposed fixed standards on emissions, fearing that they would be "minimal rather than uniform." The administration ignored Muskie's opposition, supporting national emission standards for major industrial sources of pollution. In addition, the administration's plan gave authority to regional commissions—to be staffed and financed by the federal government—to set standards for their particular regions. Muskie continued to voice opposition, and he presented his own version of the proposed bill. The compromise version, which became the 1967 law, included many of the administration's original recommendations, including a regional orientation for setting standards. However, Muskie is credited with having shaped the standard-setting procedures by placing direct responsibility both on the states and on the federal government. While the act was the first to attempt to control lead emissions from automobiles, it mandated ambient air-quality standards for coal-burning industries. In the case of the latter, at least, the coal industry and its allies believed that they had achieved the lesser of two evils by avoiding national emissions standards.⁶⁷

For his part, President Johnson had a difficult time in not playing politics with air-pollution legislation. Throughout the maneuverings over the bill, he was reluctant to come down hard against the automobile and coal industries, holding out hope that cooperation between the government and business could help to solve the problem. When HEW initially presented a proposal to the White House in 1965 calling for enforceable federal standards on automobile ex-

haust, the president queried whether the industry had been consulted. The proposal was dropped and ignored for several months. Muskie's persistence, criticism in the press, and the general momentum of the antipollution movement forced LBJ to accept a more stringent approach to standards for automobile emissions—or at least to avoid public debate over the matter.⁶⁸ A scribbled response to a suggestion that the president support the formation of a nonprofit corporation headed by business leaders to fight air pollution was telling: "Keep this away from W.H. [the White House]."⁶⁹

Water-pollution control—including sewage treatment and oil pollution—had equal standing during the Johnson years with air-pollution control. Leadership came especially from Senator Muskie, chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Air and Water Pollution. During the early 1960s, congressional leaders were ready to accelerate the pace of pollution-control legislation and to increase the federal role in water-pollution control. Before 1948, legal authority to control water pollution resided almost exclusively on the local level or in the states. But between the late 1940s and 1965, water-pollution control was mired in controversy over federal enforcement powers and financial assistance for the construction of waste-treatment plants.

In 1963, with a Democratically controlled Senate and a pervasive spirit of federal leadership in social programs, Muskie introduced significant amendments to the 1961 water-pollution-control act, including water-quality standards and the transfer of administrative authority from the Public Health Service to the new Federal Water Pollution Control Administration (FWPCA) within HEW. When it was finally passed in 1965, the Water Quality Act made significant headway in controlling some forms of water pollution.

The 1966 Clean Water Restoration Act was an important addition, growing out of a tortuous compromise between the executive branch and Congress. The administration was concerned about Senator Muskie's proposal for a huge increase in grant authorization for treatment facilities, and it was wary of granting strong pollution control authority to the states. Therefore, the administration plaid called for water-pollution control on a regional basis. Muskie disliked this approach because it placed less emphasis on the states' water quality standards which he had fought for in the 1965 legislation. Because Congress resisted the idea of regional plans, favoring instead public-works programs that would be controlled by their constituents, Muskie's version won out. While a veto was considered, the president wanted some form of water-pollution control, so he signed the bill.⁷⁰

By the last two years of the Johnson administration, interest in water-pollution control expanded to include interest in oil pollution. The sinking of the huge tanker *Torrey Canyon* in March, 1967, helped to dramatize the need for updating federal legislation in regard to oil pollution. In 1967 the Senate passed a bill that dealt with oil pollution and acid mine drainage, and in 1968 it approved a second measure, which included sections on vessel and thermal pollution. However, lack of action in the House and other delays pushed consideration of the bills until after the Santa Barbara oil-spill disaster in 1969. This left the unfair impression that the Johnson administration had neglected a form of pollution that was linked to the president's home state. Beyond legislative action, the administration had begun to consider multiagency contingency plans for responding to oil-spill emergencies. Yet, in view of the later Santa Barbara spill, hindsight suggests that the administration had not done enough to avoid an oil-pollution disaster.⁷¹

Undersecretary of the Interior David S. Black attempted to explain to an administration critic about mineral development on the Outer Continental Shelf:

In essence, we were confronted with the difficult task of achieving a balance among several factors: the right of all the people of the United States to receive the benefit of public resource development, the needs of consumers in the petroleum-short West Coast region, and the legitimate interest of the local community in preserving its natural environment.⁷²

While the Johnson administration and Congress cannot be credited with having made sweeping progress in pollution control during much of the 1960s, they did address an array of pollution problems that had been given short shrift for many years. Air and water pollution received the lion's share of attention, but there was a growing interest in oil pollution, noise pollution, sight pollution (through the beautification program), and, to a much lesser degree, strip mining and nuclear radiation. A forum for discussing these crucial environmental interests had been established on the federal level. And while government leaders did not initiate the debate over pollution, they responded to it more vigorously than had their predecessors in office.⁷³

The Urban Environment

Through an array of social programs, including beautification, the Johnson administration had demonstrated its interest in urban prob-

lems and the quality of city life. A concern about the urban environment not only grew out of the general environmental impulses of the decade; it also stemmed from the revival of interest in growth management. Planners and policy makers debated issues such as urban growth, development, national planning, environmental protection, and population management. While federal officials did not formalize a comprehensive policy of growth management for cities, they did institute individual programs.⁷⁴

The general interest in outdoor recreation had its urban aspect during the early 1960s. During the Kennedy administration, the Housing Act of 1961 had included a \$50-million fund for urban open space. In 1965, Congress had added \$310 million for the development of parks and for urban beautification. Between 1962 and 1972, the program, which was administered by the Urban Renewal Administration, granted \$442 million to more than one thousand units of government which led to the purchase of 348,000 acres. Urban-oriented parks also expanded the purposes of the national park system. The establishment of the Cape Cod National Seashore in 1961 had begun a trend which carried forward into the Johnson years with such areas as the Fire Island National Seashore (1964).⁷⁵

The Johnson administration gave particular attention to the delivery of sanitary services. As discussed earlier, the funding of sewage treatment was an important feature of water legislation. The administration also made strides in dealing with solid wastes. In a special message on the conservation and restoration of natural beauty, President Johnson called for "better solutions to the disposal of solid waste" and recommended federal legislation to assist state governments in developing comprehensive disposal programs and to provide funds for research and development. Soon after this call to action, Congress passed the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965. This act recognized the ever-mounting volume and changing character of refuse, as well as the inability of current methods to deal with the problem. Not satisfied with the act alone, Johnson, with the advice of his Scientific Advisory Committee, directed that a special study be made of the national problem of solid waste. This resulted in the 1968 National Survey of Community Solid Waste Practices. It was the first truly national study of its kind in the twentieth century.⁷⁶

The Johnson administration moved beyond the natural habitat with its historic-preservation program. The first major commitment of the federal government in the area came with the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966. This law broadened previous legislation such as the Historic Sites Act of 1935, which had authorized the Na-

tional Park Service to survey and acquire sites. The 1966 legislation authorized the secretary of the Interior to establish the National Register of Historic Places, which includes structures, sites, districts, and cultural resources of significance to the American heritage. Listing on the register was a prerequisite to the acquiring of federal matching grants for the acquisition or preservation and for federal tax benefits.⁷⁷

The Johnson administration's venture into the urban environment was the most imaginative and innovative aspect of the New Conservation, because it brought several new federal programs to the cities. While individual components of the urban programs stressed well-known concerns—namely, air and water pollution, recreational space, land use, waste disposal, and historic preservation—taken as a whole, they reflected a fresh recognition of the "urban environment." By elevating local issues to national prominence, cities no longer had to take a back seat to the wilderness as vital environmental challenges. The natural environment and the built environment were being fused in the national consciousness, possibly for the first time.

The Johnson Administration and the Environment

There is little doubt that the events of the early and mid 1960s—inside and outside of government—set the stage for the passage of NEPA and the blossoming of the modern environmental movement. Did the Johnson administration play a major role in these events? Lynton Caldwell has suggested that the "White House support for environmental-quality efforts was ambiguous." While the president convened a conference on natural beauty, he also signed legislation that resulted in the running of overhead powerlines through Woodside, California, even though the community was willing to put them underground. The secretary of the army continued to issue fill permits in San Francisco Bay, despite rising protests. And the White House remained neutral in environmental battles over the Florida Everglades and the Indiana Dunes. Even in cases where action that favored environmental causes was taken, "White House follow-up showed neither direction nor vigor." Part of the reason, Caldwell has argued, was Johnson's increasing preoccupation with the deepening conflict in Vietnam and with the growing civil disorder at home. Caldwell has concluded: "The Johnson administration, notably through the efforts of Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall, had taken a large step forward toward a national policy for the environment. But it had stopped short of the threshold. The locus of environmental policy making shifted to the Congress."⁷⁸

Caldwell's assessment is persuasive in several ways, but it is incomplete. The administration often demonstrated a lack of consistency in support of environmental issues. The president certainly grew more preoccupied with the domestic and international crises that were stymieing the Great Society. Congress did play a vital role in establishing new environmental laws. Yet, if we consider what came before the 1960s rather than what came afterwards, a slightly different perspective on the administration emerges.

It would be unfair to suggest that the New Conservation was the governmental expression of modern environmentalism, for it was not. Nevertheless, it was clearly an important transitional step between old-style resource conservation and the more recent emphasis on environmental quality and environmental protection. The effort to make conservation and natural beauty important political issues, rather than peripheral interests, separated the Johnson administration from most of its predecessors. In breadth of coverage, certainly, the New Conservation was new: urban environmentalism and antipollution acquired parity with wilderness preservation and land and water conservation. Several environmental issues that had formerly been regarded as local concerns achieved national status, including air pollution, sewage treatment, historic preservation, and waste disposal.

The Johnson administration cannot be credited with initiating the major environmental causes of the time, but it cannot be considered superfluous and certainly not obstructionist. Within the administration the commitment to environmental programs was built upon three major factors. First, key advisers within the administration—especially Stewart Udall and Lady Bird Johnson—acted as conduits between the emerging environmental movement and the White House. Some issues were filtered or modified by these intermediaries, but the administration was not cut off from the outside world, nor did it make decisions in a vacuum. Second, the tradition of federal involvement in the social welfare of Americans, which is consciously linked to the New Deal and which achieved broader expression in the Great Society, gave environmental programs a legitimate claim to administration support. And third, executive leadership was provided by a politically opportunistic president who happened to appreciate the broad outlines of environmentalism, if not the details of it.

There were limits, to be sure, in the New Conservation. The focus on federal responsibility or federal remedies to environmental problems—"creative federalism," as Udall called it—often paid little heed

to more specific local, state, or regional issues. In some cases, political compromises restrained the environmental goals that were being expressed by those outside of government; in other cases, the federal government coopted ideas and programs in an attempt to set national policy. But we must be careful not to view the Johnson administration's—or any administration's—commitment to national remedies as an accomplished fact. The diffusion of environmental programs within the bureaucracy, the lack of a clear institutional focal point for structuring environmental policy, the myriad conflicting goals and vested interests that are represented in the executive, judicial and legislative branches of government—all worked against a cohesive national policy in regard to the environment.

The Johnson administration's New Conservation was broad, sometimes bold, and often controversial. To some, it went too far; to many environmentalists, it did not go far enough. If its place in history is not yet well established, it is because we as yet do not know what to make of a president who led us simultaneously into Vietnam and into the Great Society. We barely have a feel for the institutional mechanisms within the federal bureaucracy and Congress that shape environmental laws and carry them out. And we still know all too little about the modern environmental movement and its potential repercussions. If the study of the New Conservation has yet to provide many answers, it raises many gnawing questions about the state of environmental affairs in the United States.

Notes

1. "An Interim Conservation Report to the President from Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall," July 26, 1968; memo, Harry J. Hogan to Udall, July 26, 1968; memo "The 50 most significant beautification measures signed into law by President Lyndon B. Johnson through July 22, 1968," July 25, 1968; "Beautification and Conservation Measures," office files of W. De Vier Pierson, box 11; memo, W. De Vier Pierson to the President, Aug. 9, 1968, Ex NR, box 6; memo, Udall to Joseph A. Califano, Jr., Feb. 23, 1966, White House central files (hereafter cited as WHCF), Ex NR, box 5, Johnson Library. All files, unless otherwise specified, are in the Johnson Library.

2. J. Leonard Bates, "Fulfilling American Democracy: The Conservation Movement, 1907 to 1921," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 44 (June, 1957): 29–57; Samuel P. Hays, *Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890–1920* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1959); see also James L. Penick, Jr., *Progressive Politics and Conservation: The Ballinger-Pinchot Affair* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968); Lewis L. Gould, ed., *The Progressive Era* (Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1974).

3. Joseph M. Petulla, *American Environmental History: The Exploitation and Conservation of Natural Resources* (San Francisco, Calif.: Boyd & Fraser, 1977), p. 318.

4. Richard N. L. Andrews, "Class Politics or Democratic Reform: Environmentalism and American Political Institutions," *Natural Resources Journal* 20 (Apr., 1980): 221–41. For a contrasting view see William Tucker, *Progress and Privilege: America in the Age of Environmentalism* (New York: Doubleday, 1982).

5. Some of the recent studies on the environmental movement include Walter A. Rosenbaum, *The Politics of Environmental Concern* (New York: Praeger, 1973); Petulla, *American Environmental History*, and *American Environmentalism: Values, Tactics, Priorities* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1980); Allan Schnaiberg, *The Environment: From Surplus to Scarcity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); Carroll W. Pursell, Jr., ed., *From Conservation to Ecology: The Development of Environmental Concern* (New York: Crowell, 1973); Roderick Nash, ed., *The American Environment: Readings in the History of Conservation*, 2d ed. (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1976); Odum Ranning, *Man and His Environment: Citizen Action* (New York: Harper & Row, 1975); Ian G. Barbour, *Technology, Environment, and Human Values* (New York: Praeger, 1980); Phillip O. Foss, *Politics and Ecology* (Belmont, Calif.: Duxbury Press, 1972); William Ophuls, *Ecology and the Politics of Scarcity: Prologue to a Political Theory of the Steady State* (San Francisco, Calif.: W. H. Freeman, 1977); Mancur Olson and Hans H. Landsberg, eds., *The No-Growth Society* (New York: Norton, 1973); Barry Commoner, *The Closing Circle: Nature, Man and Technology* (New York: Bantam, 1971); Donald Fleming, "Roots of the New Conservation Movement," *Perspectives in American History* 6 (1972): 7–91.

6. Samuel P. Hays, "From Conservation to Environment: Environmental Politics in the United States since World War II," *Environmental Review* 6 (Fall, 1982): 24–27; see also Hays, "The Structure of Environmental Politics since World War II," *Journal of Social History* (Summer, 1981): 533–37, 719–38 and "Three Decades of Environmental Politics: The Historical Context" (paper delivered at the Conference on the Evolution of American Environmental Politics, June, 1984, the Wilson Center, Washington, D.C.).

7. Memo, Stewart L. Udall to the President, Oct. 17, 1968, WHCF, Ex NR, box 6; see also memo, Udall to the President, Dec. 13, 1965, *ibid.*; Udall to Robert B. White, Nov. 11, 1965, WHCF, NR 4, box 12.

8. James L. Sundquist, *Politics and Policy: The Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson Years* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1968), p. 345.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 345–61; Richard A. Cooley, "Introduction," in *Congress and the Environment*, ed. Richard A. Cooley and Geoffrey Wandersforde Smith (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1970), pp. xiii–xiv, 28; Frank E. Smith, ed., *Land and Water, 1900–1970* (New York: Harper & Row, 1971) pp. 683–715; see also *Public Papers of the Presidents, 1961–1963*; Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., *A Thousand Days* (Greenwich, Conn.: Fawcett, 1965) p. 363.

10. Quoted in Sundquist, *Politics and Policy*, p. 362.

11. For background on the conference see WHCF, NR, boxes 2 to 4.

12. Lady Bird Johnson, *A White House Diary* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970), p. 215.

13. Memo, Matthew Nimetz to Califano, Dec. 11, 1967, Office Files of James Gaither, box 196.

14. Memo, Udall to the President, Oct. 17, 1968, WHCF, Ex NR, box 6.

15. Vaughn Davis Bornet, *The Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1983), pp. 136, 139. For a thorough discussion of Lady Bird's role in beautification see Lewis L. Gould's essay on the First Lady, below.

16. Douglas H. Strong, *The Conservationists* (Menlo Park, Calif.: Addison-Wesley, 1971), p. 168; see also Strong, "The Rise of American Esthetic Conservation: Muir, Mather, and Udall," *National Parks Magazine* 44 (1970): 5-9.

17. Transcript, Stewart Udall oral history interview, 1969, by Joe B. Frantz, tape 1, pp. 32-36.

18. Strong, *Conservationists*, pp. 170-74; Bornet, *Presidency of Lyndon B. Johnson*, pp. 27, 137-46.

19. See Peter Wild, *Pioneer Conservationists of Western America* (Missoula, Mont.: Mountain Press, 1979), pp. 180-81; Barbara Le Unes, "Stewart Lee Udall" in *Encyclopedia of American Forest and Conservation History*, ed. Richard C. Davis, vol. 2 (New York: Macmillan, 1983), pp. 665-66; Cooley, "Introduction," p. xiv; see also Barbara Le Unes, "The Conservation Philosophy of Stewart L. Udall, 1961-1968" (Ph.D. diss., Texas A & M University, 1977).

20. Stewart L. Udall, *The Quiet Crisis* (New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1963), p. viii. Before leaving office, Udall wrote 1976: *Agenda for Tomorrow* (New York: Harcourt Brace & World, 1968).

21. Despite his crucial role in the evolution of American environmentalism, there is no full-length biography available at this time, and only a few article-length studies. WHCF, NR and FG 145 (Department of the Interior) contain the richest correspondence on Udall's role in establishing conservation policies and programs. Also useful are the administrative history of the Department of the Interior and the Records of the Executive Departments, Department of the Interior, Office of the Secretary, microfilm rolls 1-21 and boxes 1-5, 82, in the Johnson Library. To complement these sources see the Stewart Udall Papers at the University of Arizona.

22. Cynthia Wilson, "Lyndon Johnson, Conservationist," *Audubon* 75 (Mar., 1973): 122.

23. Transcript, Udall oral history interview, 1969, tape 1, p. 32.

24. Quoted in Sundquist, *Politics and Policy*, p. 362.

25. Johnson to Ray K. Linsley, Dec. 15, 1964, EX FG 11-9, box 121B.

26. Lynton K. Caldwell, *Environment: A Challenge for Modern Society* (Garden City, N.Y.: Natural History Press, 1970), p. 54.

27. Cooley and Wandesforde-Smith, eds., *Congress and the Environment*, p. xiv.

28. Caldwell, *Environment*, p. 53.

29. John P. Crevelli, "The Final Act of the Greatest Conservation President," *Prologue* 12 (Winter, 1980): 174.

30. *Ibid.*, p. 190.

31. John C. Whitaker, *Striking a Balance: Environment and Natural Resources Policy in the Nixon-Ford Years* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1976), pp. 58-60; see also Geof-

frey Wandesforde-Smith, "National Policy for the Environment," in *Congress and the Environment*, pp. 210-11.

32. Memo, Udall to Califano, Dec. 27, 1965, WHCF, Ex NR, box 4; see also transcript, Udall oral history interview, tape 1, p. 34.

33. Memo, Califano to the President, Sept. 8, 1965; Udall to the President, Sept. 2, 1965, HE 8-1, box 22; memo, Califano to the President, Aug. 31, 1966, FG 145; memo, Califano to the President, Jan. 14, 1966; memo Charles L. Schultze to the President, Jan. 11, 1966, FG 165, box 250; memo Califano to the President, Feb. 14, 1966, LE/NR, box 142—all in WHCF.

34. Memo, John W. Gardner to Califano, Dec. 27, 1965; letter, Edmund S. Muskie to Udall, Feb. 7, 1966; Califano to the President, Feb. 18, 1966, FG 165, box 250—all in WHCF.

35. Edward Weinberg and Henry P. Caulfield, Jr., to Udall, Feb. 4, 1966, HE 8, box 24; memo, Califano to the President, Feb. 14, 1966; memo, Udall to Califano, Feb. 14, 1966, LE/NR, box 142; memo, Donald Hornig to Califano Jan. 25, 1966, FG 11, box 122—all in WHCF. According to J. Clarence Davies III and Barbara S. Davies, in *The Politics of Pollution*, 2d ed. (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1975), p. 34. "Early in 1966 the newly created Federal Water Pollution Control Administration was transferred from HEW to the Department of Interior. The latter was much less committed to working through the states than HEW had been. Furthermore, the Democratic administration was less convinced of the value of a strong state role in pollution control than was the Congress."

36. The Johnson Library holds administrative histories for the FPC, HEW, TVA, and Interior, among others. However, these histories are largely uncritical narratives. The supporting documents are more useful. See also subject files for FG, WHCF, for individual agencies, bureaus, and commissions.

37. See the administrative history of OST and the oral interview with Donald Hornig; see also memo, Ivan L. Bennett, Jr., to Califano, Sept. 14, 1967, Presidential Task Force on the Quality of the Environment, box 196; office files of Horace Busby, boxes 25, 29; James Everett Katz, "Presidential Politics and Policy for Science and Technology, 1953-1973" (Ph.D. diss., Rutgers University, 1974).

38. OST Administrative History, vol. 2: "Environmental Quality," p. 1, Johnson Library.

39. Transcript, Donald F. Hornig oral history interview, p. 28.

40. See note 39; see also memo, Bennett to Nimetz, Mar. 18, 1968; memo Phillip S. Hughes to Nimetz, Jan. 4, 1968; memo, Hornig to Califano, Dec. 15, 1967, President's Task Force subject file, box 38—both in WHCF.

41. Wandesforde-Smith, "National Policy," pp. 211-13; see also memo Hornig to Califano, Dec. 15, 1967, Presidential Task Force subject file, box 38.

42. See list 1 in the Appendix; see also Davies and Davies, *Politics of Pollution*, p. 68.

43. Executive Branch Comments on "Report of the Task Force on the Preservation of Natural Beauty—November 18, 1964," Dec. 1, 1964, prepared by Department of the Interior, Task Force subject file; see also memo, Interior to the President, Dec. 2, 1964, FG 600.

44. Memo, E. Fenton Shepard to Director, Bureau of the Budget, Dec. 6, 1967, files of James C. Gaither, box 55.

45. Roderick Nash, *Wilderness and the American Mind* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 221.

46. See Craig W. Allin, *The Politics of Wilderness Preservation* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), pp. 102ff.; Michael Frome, *Battle for the Wilderness* (New York: Praeger, 1974); Michael McCloskey, "Wilderness Movement at the Crossroads, 1945-1970," *Pacific Historical Review* 41 (1972): 346-61; Frank Graham, Jr., *Man's Dominion: The Story of Conservation in America* (New York: M. Evans & Co., 1971), pp. 301-9; Frank E. Smith, *Politics of Conservation* (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 295-96; Delbert V. Mercure, Jr., and William M. Ross, "The Wilderness Act: A Product of Congressional Compromise," in *Congress and the Environment*, pp. 47-64; Sundquist, *Politics and Policy*, pp. 336-40, 355-61; Petulla, *American Environmentalism*, pp. 45-47.

47. Frank Gregg, "Federal Government and Public Land Policy" (paper delivered at the Conference on the Evolution of American Environmental Politics, June, 1984, the Wilson Center, Washington, D.C.), pp. 13-17. In addition to the Natural Resources file, the following subject files in the WHCF at the Johnson Library are most useful in understanding the Johnson administration's wilderness and national park policy: FG 710: Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission; FG 738: President's Council on Recreation and Natural Beauty; FG 747: Public Land Law Review Commission; LE/NR 3: Legislation/Forests; LE/NR 4: Legislation/Land; LE/PA: Legislation/Parks-Monuments; LE/PA 3: Legislation/Parks; PA: Parks/Monuments; PA3: Parks. The following Aides files also include valuable information on key legislation: Horace Busby, box 4(1296); Joseph Califano, box 28(1736); James Gaither, box 4; Richard Goodwin, box 10(641); Harry McPherson, box 11(1412); and Bill Moyers, box 133(1577); see also Marion Clawson, *The Federal Lands Revisited* (Washington, D.C.: Resources for the Future, 1983), and *The Bureau of Land Management* (New York: Praeger, 1971); Alfred Runte, *National Parks: The American Experience* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1979).

48. The courts were playing an increasingly important role in environmental policy by the mid 1960s. The landmark case of *Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Federal Power Commission* in 1965 led the way for environmental organizations as effective litigants in the courts. For more details on environmental law see Joseph Sax, *Defending the Environment: A Strategy for Citizen Action* (New York: Knopf, 1971).

49. Crevelli, "Final Act," pp. 189-91.

50. The relationship between LBJ and Udall had been strained because of the Vietnam War. In fact, Udall had considered resigning, in part because of his differences of opinion over the war policy (see *ibid.*, pp. 188-89).

51. Cited by Dennis G. Asmussen and Thomas P. Bouchard in "Wild and Scenic Rivers," in *Congress and the Environment*, p. 165; see also memo, Interior to the President, Dec. 2, 1964, FG 600.

52. *Ibid.*; see also 1967 Task Force on the Quality of the Environment, files of James C. Gaither, box 55.

53. Sundquist, *Politics and Policy*, pp. 372-73; Asmussen and Bouchard, "Wild and Scenic Rivers," pp. 163-74.

54. Udall oral history interview, tape 1, p. 39.

55. Memo, Hornig to Califano, May 18, 1967; draft letter, Hornig to Carl Hayden, May 18, 1967, NR 7, box 17; letter, Elmer B. Staats to Udall, May 25, 1964, and attachments, NR 7, box 14; letter, William L. Guy to Clifton C. Carter, Apr. 24, 1964, NR 7, box 14—all in WHCF. Additional information on various water projects and desalination can be found in NR 7, boxes 18-29; Ex UT 4, box 13; Ex FG 145, box 204; Gen FG 145, box 207; LE/NR 7, boxes 143-45; see also WHCF subject file for various commissions on waterways and river basins.

56. Keith W. Muckleston, "Water Projects and Recreation Benefits," in *Congress and the Environment*, pp. 112-29.

57. Memo, Bureau of the Budget to Califano, Jan. 17, 1966, WHCF, Ex NR 7, box 15.

58. Hays, "Structure of Environmental Politics," p. 721; Cooley and Wandesforde-Smith, *Congress and the Environment*, p. 235; see also 1966 Task Force on Resources and Recreation.

59. Thomas R. Dunlap, "The Federal Government, Wildlife and Endangered Species" (paper delivered at the Conference on the Evolution of American Environmental Politics, June, 1986, the Wilson Center, Washington, D.C.), pp. 21-24; see also Michael J. Bean, *The Evolution of National Wildlife Law* (Washington, D.C.: Environmental Law Institute, 1978); Howard P. Brokaw, ed., *Wildlife and America* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978); Lewis Regenstein, *The Politics of Extinction* (New York: Macmillan, 1975).

60. Crevelli, "Final Act," pp. 179-80.

61. Aside from files on fisheries commissions and a few other distantly related files, the Johnson Library does not contain extensive materials on wildlife issues.

62. See Stephen Fox, *John Muir and His Legacy: The American Conservation Movement* (Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1981), pp. 291-306; Thomas R. Dunlap, *DDT: Scientists, Citizens, and Public Policy* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981), pp. 3-5; Hays, "Three Decades," pp. 15-17.

63. Press release, Johnson to Hornig, Nov. 4, 1965, FG 11-9, box 122.

64. Report of the 1964 Task Force on Environmental Pollution, pp. 2-3, files of James C. Gaither.

65. Richard H. K. Vietor, *Environmental Politics and the Coal Coalition* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1980), pp. 127-54; Martin V. Melosi, "Energy and Environment in the Era of Fossil Fuels" (paper delivered at the Conference on the Evolution of American Environmental Politics, June, 1984, the Wilson Center, Washington, D.C.), pp. 25-26.

66. James E. Krier and Edmund Ursin, *Pollution and Policy: A Case Essay on California and Federal Experience with Motor Vehicle Air Pollution 1940-1975* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977); U.S., Department of Commerce, *The Automobile and Air Pollution* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1967), pp. 1-28; Rex R. Campbell and Jerry L. Wade eds., *Society and Environment: The Coming Collision* (Boston, Mass.: Allyn & Bacon, 1972), pp. 145-62; Davies and Davies, *Politics of Pollution*, pp. 49-58.

67. Vietor, *Environmental Politics*, pp. 143, 148; Davies and Davies, *Politics of Pollution*, pp. 49-52.

68. Sundquist, *Politics and Policy*, pp. 368-71.

69. Memo, Califano to the President, May 31, 1967, WHCF, HE 8-1, box 22; see also memo, James Gaither to Fred Panzer, Oct. 30, 1968, Task Forces, box 19; memo, President to Secretary of HEW, et al., Apr. 21, 1967; memo, Wilbur J. Cohen to the President, July 14, 1967; memo, Udall to the President, Jan. 23, 1968, HE 8-1, box 22—all in WHCF; see also Hays, "Three Decades," pp. 56-57.

70. Davies and Davies, *Politics of Pollution*, pp. 28-35; Sundquist, *Politics and Policy*, pp. 363-67; see also memo, Kermit Gordon to Wilson, Mar. 6, 1965, HE 8-4, box 24; letter, President to Philip H. Hoff, June 24, 1965, NR 4, box 11; memo, Udall to Califano and Wilson, Aug. 24, 1966; memo, W. W. Rostow to the President, May 11, 1967; memo, President to Dean Rusk, no date; memo, Hornig to the President, June 1, 1967, NR 7, box 17; memo, Schultze to Califano, Dec. 11, 1967, Presidential Task Forces subject file, box 39—all in WHCF.

71. Davies and Davies, *Politics of Pollution*, pp. 35-39; see also memo, President to Udall and Secretary of Treasury, May 26, 1967, Ex NR, box 5; memo, Wilfred H. Rommel to Califano, Sept. 8, 1967; memo, Nimetz to Califano, Sept. 23, 1967; Rommel to Califano, Oct. 19, 1967; Briefing Paper on Oil Pollution, Nov. 12, 1968, Presidential Task Force subject file, box 39; memo, President to Clark M. Clifford, et al., June 7, 1968, FG 11-9, box 122—all in WHCF. For information on the Johnson energy policy see James C. Cochran, "Energy Policy in the Johnson Administration: Logical Order versus Economic Pluralism," in *Energy Policy in Perspective: Today's Problems, Yesterday's Solutions*, ed. Craufurd D. Goodwin (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1981), p. 337; Richard H. K. Vietor, *Energy Policy in America since Nineteen Hundred Forty-five: A Study of Business-Government Relations* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1984), p. 135; Melosi, "Energy and Environment." For information on an array of energy issues in the presidential papers see, e.g., IT 5-2, Coal and Steel Community, box 2; LE/NR 5 Legislation/Minerals-Metals, boxes 142, 144; LE/NR 6 Legislation/Oil-Natural Gas, boxes 142, 144; Natural Resources, see subdivisions, WHCF; office files of Joseph Califano, box 7(1416); office files of Bill Moyers, box 78 (1391); office files of W. De Vier Pierson, boxes 8-10; 1964 Task Force on Natural Resources; see also "Oil, Oil Reserves, and the Environment; Energy Sources," a listing prepared by the staff of the Johnson Library.

72. Letter, David S. Black to John J. Laux, Jan. 5, 1968, WHCF, NR 6, box 13.

73. Material on various forms of pollution is interspersed throughout the NR files and other files dealing with natural resources, as well as most of the task-force reports, especially the 1964 Task Force on Environmental Pollution and the 1965 Task Force on Pollution Abatement.

74. Ann L. Strong, "The Rise and Decline of an Urban Conscience: Urban Environments, Recreation, and Historic Preservation" (paper delivered at the Evolution of American Environmental Politics Conference, June, 1984, the Wilson Center, Washington, D.C.), pp. 22-28.

75. Ibid., pp. 22ff.; see also Ann L. Strong, *Open Space for Urban America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1965).

76. Martin V. Melosi, *Garbage in the Cities: Refuse, Reform and the Environment, 1880-1980* (College Station: Texas A & M University Press, 1981), pp. 199-201.

77. A. L. Strong, "Rise and Decline," pp. 50-52. Almost all of the task-force reports deal with some aspect of the urban environment.

78. Caldwell, *Environment*, pp. 56, 199-200, 207-8. *get*

Appendix

Task Forces on the Environment

- 1964 Task Force on Environmental Pollution
 - Task Force on Natural Resources
 - Task Force on the Preservation of Natural Beauty
- 1965 Task Force on Pollution Abatement
- 1966 Task Force on Natural Resource Studies
 - Task Force on the Quality of the Environment
 - Task Force on Resources and Recreation
- 1967 Task Force on the Quality of the Environment
- 1968 Task Force on the Quality of the Environment

SOURCE: White House Central Files, Task Force Reports, Johnson Library

Major Legislation on the Environment, 1963-68

- 1963 Clean Air Act
- 1964 Canyonlands National Park
 - Fire Island National Seashore
 - Water Resources Research Act
 - Wilderness Act
- 1965 Federal Water Project Recreation Act
 - Highway Beautification Act
 - Land and Water Conservation Fund Act
 - Solid Waste Disposal Act
 - Water Quality Act
 - Water Resources Planning Act
- 1966 Clean Water Restoration Act
 - Endangered Species Act
 - Federal Coal Mine Safety Act
 - Fish and Wildlife Conservation Protection Act
 - Historic Preservation Act
 - Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore
- 1967 Air Quality Act
 - National Emissions Standards Act
- 1968 National Trails Act
 - Redwood National Park
 - Wild and Scenic Rivers Act